The price of selfish routing

DOI10.1145/380752.380846zbMath1323.91006MaRDI QIDQ5176009

Marios Mavronicolas, Paul G. Spirakis

Publication date: 27 February 2015

Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/380752.380846

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

90B10: Deterministic network models in operations research

90B20: Traffic problems in operations research

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