Equilibria for networks with malicious users

DOI10.1007/S10107-006-0015-2MaRDI QIDQ985313zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George Karakostas, Anastasios Viglas

Publication date 21 July 2010

Published in Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-006-0015-2

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumsaddle pointselfish routingmalicious user

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)

Recommendations

• Algorithms and Computation
• Congestion games with malicious players
• Selfish Routing with Oblivious Users
• Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2003
• Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079324 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119691 (Why is no real title available?)
• Algorithms and Computation
• Convex Analysis
• Equilibria on a Congested Transportation Network
• How bad is selfish routing?
• On the relationship between Nash—Cournot and Wardrop equilibria
• Stackelberg scheduling strategies
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
• The price of selfish routing
• Traffic assignment problem for a general network
• Worst-case equilibria

Cited in

(8)

• Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
• Computational aspects of uncertainty profiles and angel-daemon games
• Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
• Algorithms and Computation
• The Price of Malice: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Malicious Behavior in Distributed Systems
• Internalization of social cost in congestion games
• Congestion games with malicious players
• Uniform mixed equilibria in network congestion games with link failures

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