Equilibria for networks with malicious users

DOI10.1007/S10107-006-0015-2zbMATH Open1203.90032OpenAlexW2075488114MaRDI QIDQ985313FDOQ985313

Authors: George Karakostas, Anastasios Viglas 

Publication date: 21 July 2010

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-006-0015-2

Recommendations

• Algorithms and Computation
• Congestion games with malicious players
• Selfish Routing with Oblivious Users
• Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2003
• Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumsaddle pointselfish routingmalicious user

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)

Cites Work

• Convex Analysis
• Worst-case equilibria
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
• How bad is selfish routing?
• On the relationship between Nash—Cournot and Wardrop equilibria
• Traffic assignment problem for a general network
• Equilibria on a Congested Transportation Network
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stackelberg scheduling strategies
• The price of selfish routing
• Algorithms and Computation

Cited In (8)

• Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
• Computational aspects of uncertainty profiles and angel-daemon games
• Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
• Algorithms and Computation
• The Price of Malice: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Malicious Behavior in Distributed Systems
• Internalization of social cost in congestion games
• Congestion games with malicious players
• Uniform mixed equilibria in network congestion games with link failures

This page was built for publication: Equilibria for networks with malicious users

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q985313)