Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.06.006zbMath1168.91332OpenAlexW2083663874MaRDI QIDQ834861

Yogeshwer Sharma, David P. Williamson

Publication date: 27 August 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/1813/5739

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg equilibriumgame theoryNash equilibriumprice of anarchyaltruistic flowcentrally controlled flowStackelberg threshold

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (5)

Backward induction algorithm for a class of closed-loop Stackelberg games ⋮ Solution for a class of closed-loop leader-follower games with convexity conditions on the payoffs ⋮ The price of optimum: complexity and approximation for a matching game ⋮ The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography

Cites Work

• Congestion games with malicious players
• Equilibria for networks with malicious users
• The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions
• Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
• Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
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