The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions
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Publication:1006047
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2008.11.002zbMath1157.91016OpenAlexW2054243761MaRDI QIDQ1006047
Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis
Publication date: 17 March 2009
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2008.11.002
Related Items (11)
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism ⋮ Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling ⋮ A Glimpse at Paul G. Spirakis ⋮ A Selective Tour Through Congestion Games ⋮ Efficient methods for selfish network design ⋮ Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow ⋮ Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games ⋮ Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow ⋮ Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions ⋮ The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions ⋮ Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks
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