scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6469163
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Publication:5501276
zbMATH Open1318.90016MaRDI QIDQ5501276FDOQ5501276
Authors: Henry W. Lin, Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos 
Publication date: 3 August 2015
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Noncooperative games (91A10) Flows in graphs (05C21) Games involving graphs (91A43)
Cited In (10)
- Efficient methods for selfish network design
- How much can taxes help selfish routing?
- The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions
- Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- Network investment games with Wardrop followers
- Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
- Braess's paradox for flows over time
- Network pricing: how to induce optimal flows under strategic link operators
- On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games
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