scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6469163

MaRDI QIDQ5501276zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Henry W. Lin, Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos

Publication date 3 August 2015

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Noncooperative games (91A10) Flows in graphs (05C21) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cited in

(9)

• Network investment games with Wardrop followers
• Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
• The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions
• Efficient methods for selfish network design
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
• On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
• On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games
• Network pricing: how to induce optimal flows under strategic link operators

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