Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3602835
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_11zbMath1209.91046OpenAlexW1876382026MaRDI QIDQ3602835
Publication date: 12 February 2009
Published in: Approximation and Online Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_11
Related Items (4)
Resilience of Routing in Parallel Link Networks ⋮ Collusion in Atomic Splittable Routing Games ⋮ “Beat-Your-Rival” Routing Games ⋮ Balancing Load via Small Coalitions in Selfish Ring Routing Games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions
- Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks
- The effect of collusion in congestion games
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Technical Note—Traffic Equilibrium Paradoxes
- Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games
- Network Games with Atomic Players
- Atomic Congestion Games Among Coalitions
- Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
- Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
- Traffic assignment problem for a general network
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
- The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
This page was built for publication: Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
