Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
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Publication:3602835
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6469241 (Why is no real title available?)
- Atomic Congestion Games Among Coalitions
- Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
- Network Games with Atomic Players
- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- Selfish routing with atomic players
- Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
- Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games
- Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks
- Technical Note—Traffic Equilibrium Paradoxes
- The effect of collusion in congestion games
- The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions
- The price of routing unsplittable flow
- Traffic assignment problem for a general network
- Worst-case equilibria
Cited in
(9)- Resilience of routing in parallel link networks
- The price of collusion in series-parallel networks
- Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
- Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow
- Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
- ``Beat-your-rival routing games
- Balancing Load via Small Coalitions in Selfish Ring Routing Games
- Flow sharing and bankruptcy games
- The effect of collusion in congestion games
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