Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2392243
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1179517 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7051244 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2086616 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5060482 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6469241 (Why is no real title available?)
- A polynomial algorithm for minimum quadratic cost flow problems
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- Atomic congestion games among coalitions
- Braess's Paradox in large random graphs
- Coalitions in nonatomic network congestion games
- Competitive routing in networks with polynomial costs
- Computing Pure Nash and Strong Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games
- Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
- Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
- Faster Algorithms for Minimum Cycle Basis in Directed Graphs
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
- Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
- Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in atomic splittable congestion games
- Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
- On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- On the value of coordination in network design
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- Selfish unsplittable flows
- Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
- Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
- Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow
- Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing
- Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
- Strong price of anarchy
- Stronger bounds on Braess's paradox and the maximum latency of selfish routing
- Technical Note—Traffic Equilibrium Paradoxes
- The effect of collusion in congestion games
- The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
- The impact of oligopolistic competition in networks
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- The price of collusion in series-parallel networks
- The price of routing unsplittable flow
- Topology of series-parallel networks
- Worst-case equilibria
Cited in
(10)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7378728 (Why is no real title available?)
- The effect of collusion in congestion games
- Equilibrium computation in resource allocation games
- Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
- Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games
- Generalizations of weighted matroid congestion games: pure Nash equilibrium, sensitivity analysis, and discrete convex function
- Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
- Selfishness, collusion and power of local search for the ADMs minimization problem
- The price of collusion in series-parallel networks
- Complexity and parametric computation of equilibria in atomic splittable congestion games via weighted block Laplacians
This page was built for publication: Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2392243)
