Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
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Publication:2392243
DOI10.1007/S00224-012-9421-4zbMATH Open1270.91016OpenAlexW2905629897MaRDI QIDQ2392243FDOQ2392243
Authors: Chien-Chung Huang 
Publication date: 1 August 2013
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9421-4
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Cited In (9)
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- The effect of collusion in congestion games
- Equilibrium computation in resource allocation games
- Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
- Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games
- Generalizations of weighted matroid congestion games: pure Nash equilibrium, sensitivity analysis, and discrete convex function
- Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
- Selfishness, collusion and power of local search for the ADMs minimization problem
- The price of collusion in series-parallel networks
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