Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.09.026MaRDI QIDQ322512zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cheng Wan

Publication date 7 October 2016

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.03479

zbMATH Keywords

routingStackelberg gamedecentralizationcomposite congestion game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Abstract: This paper studies strategic decentralization in binary choice composite network congestion games. A player decentralizes if she lets some autonomous agents to decide respectively how to send different parts of her stock from the origin to the destination. This paper shows that, with convex, strictly increasing and differentiable arc cost functions, an atomic splittable player always has an optimal unilateral decentralization strategy. Besides, unilateral decentralization gives her the same advantage as being the leader in a Stackelberg congestion game. Finally, unilateral decentralization of an atomic player has a negative impact on the social cost and on the costs of the other players at the equilibrium of the congestion game.

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Cited in

(3)

• Monotonicity of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
• Toll caps in privatized road networks
• Decentralisation conscious players and system reliability

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