Toll caps in privatized road networks
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Publication:1734347
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.01.059zbMath1430.90166arXiv1802.10514OpenAlexW2789039638WikidataQ128449329 ScholiaQ128449329MaRDI QIDQ1734347
Tobias Harks, Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen
Publication date: 27 March 2019
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.10514
Related Items (9)
Extensions of Nash Games in Finite and Infinite Dimensions with Applications ⋮ Negative prices in network pricing games ⋮ Multiscale control of Stackelberg games ⋮ Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess paradox considering elastic demand ⋮ Price of anarchy for parallel link networks with generalized mean objective ⋮ Stackelberg pricing games with congestion effects ⋮ A review of transport market modeling using game-theoretic principles ⋮ Network investment games with Wardrop followers ⋮ Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators
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