Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_27MaRDI QIDQ3095283zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincenzo Bonifaci, Mahyar Salek, Guido Schäfer

Publication date 28 October 2011

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/17202

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Applications of game theory (91A80) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)

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Cited in

(17)

• The impact of worst-case deviations in non-atomic network routing games
• The impact of worst-case deviations in non-atomic network routing games
• Computing optimal tolls with arc restrictions and heterogeneous players
• Risk-averse selfish routing
• Demand-independent optimal tolls
• Toll caps in privatized road networks
• The minimum tollbooth problem in atomic network congestion games with unsplittable flows
• Existence of anonymous link tolls for decentralizing an oligopolistic game and the efficiency analysis
• Tight inefficiency bounds for perception-parameterized affine congestion games
• Achieving target equilibria in network routing games without knowing the latency functions
• Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players
• Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players
• Beyond Pigouvian taxes: a worst case analysis
• A traffic congestion analysis by user equilibrium and system optimum with incomplete information
• Price of anarchy for parallel link networks with generalized mean objective
• Network spot‐checking games: Theory and application to toll enforcing in transportation networks
• Network pricing: how to induce optimal flows under strategic link operators

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