Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_27zbMATH Open1233.90077OpenAlexW2159043441MaRDI QIDQ3095283FDOQ3095283
Authors: Vincenzo Bonifaci, Mahyar Salek, Guido Schäfer 
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/17202
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Cited In (17)
- The impact of worst-case deviations in non-atomic network routing games
- The impact of worst-case deviations in non-atomic network routing games
- Computing optimal tolls with arc restrictions and heterogeneous players
- The minimum tollbooth problem in atomic network congestion games with unsplittable flows
- Toll caps in privatized road networks
- Existence of anonymous link tolls for decentralizing an oligopolistic game and the efficiency analysis
- Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms
- Tight inefficiency bounds for perception-parameterized affine congestion games
- Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players
- Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players
- Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators
- Beyond Pigouvian taxes: a worst case analysis
- A traffic congestion analysis by user equilibrium and system optimum with incomplete information
- Price of anarchy for parallel link networks with generalized mean objective
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Risk-Averse Selfish Routing
- Network spot‐checking games: Theory and application to toll enforcing in transportation networks
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