Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players
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Publication:2300632
DOI10.1007/S00224-019-09946-8zbMATH Open1443.91032OpenAlexW2972341206MaRDI QIDQ2300632FDOQ2300632
Authors: Dimitris Fotakis, Dimitris Kalimeris, Thanasis Lianeas
Publication date: 27 February 2020
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-019-09946-8
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Cites Work
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- When the players are not expectation maximizers
- The Recognition of Series Parallel Digraphs
- Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
- Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
- Cost-balancing tolls for atomic network congestion games
- Stochastic selfish routing
- Stochastic congestion games with risk-averse players
- Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
- Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players
- The impact of worst-case deviations in non-atomic network routing games
- Computing optimal tolls with arc restrictions and heterogeneous players
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