Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
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Publication:2581266
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2005.09.014zbMath1081.90009OpenAlexW1536417626MaRDI QIDQ2581266
Publication date: 9 January 2006
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2005.09.014
Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Games involving graphs (91A43)
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