Computing Optimal Tolls with Arc Restrictions and Heterogeneous Players

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.STACS.2014.433zbMath1360.91046OpenAlexW2288112308MaRDI QIDQ2965506

Tomas Jelinek, Marcus Klaas, Guido Schäfer

Publication date: 3 March 2017

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2014.433

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneous playerscoordination mechanismsnetwork routing gamesnetwork tollstaxing subnetworks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Programming involving graphs or networks (90C35) Games involving graphs (91A43) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

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Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players ⋮ Toll caps in privatized road networks ⋮ Congestion games with priority-based scheduling ⋮ The price of anarchy of affine congestion games with similar strategies ⋮ Improving selfish routing for risk-averse players ⋮ Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators

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