A traffic congestion analysis by user equilibrium and system optimum with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S10878-020-00663-4MaRDI QIDQ2156302zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Qiang Zhang, Shi Qiang Liu, Mahmoud Masoud

Publication date 18 July 2022

Published in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-020-00663-4

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationtraffic congestionuser equilibriumBraess paradoxsystem optimumintelligent navigation systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites work

• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
• Congestion Games with Player-Specific Constants
• Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
• How bad is selfish routing?
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
• Nonlinear programming
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• The price of routing unsplittable flow
• Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
• Traffic assignment problem for a general network
• Uncertainty in Multicommodity Routing Networks: When Does It Help?

Cited in

(4)

• Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
• Game-theoretic approach for modeling of selfish and group routing
• A real-world mine excavators timetabling methodology in open-pit mining
• An \(N\)-path user equilibrium for transportation networks

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