A traffic congestion analysis by user equilibrium and system optimum with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S10878-020-00663-4zbMATH Open1495.90048OpenAlexW3096108000MaRDI QIDQ2156302FDOQ2156302

Authors: Qiang Zhang, Shi Qiang Liu, Mahmoud Masoud 

Publication date: 18 July 2022

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-020-00663-4

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zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationtraffic congestionuser equilibriumBraess paradoxsystem optimumintelligent navigation systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
• Traffic assignment problem for a general network
• The price of routing unsplittable flow
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Congestion Games with Player-Specific Constants
• Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
• Nonlinear programming
• Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
• Uncertainty in Multicommodity Routing Networks: When Does It Help?

Cited In (4)

• A real-world mine excavators timetabling methodology in open-pit mining
• Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
• An \(N\)-path user equilibrium for transportation networks
• Game-theoretic approach for modeling of selfish and group routing

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