Beyond Pigouvian taxes: a worst case analysis
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Publication:2152117
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_13OpenAlexW4205685765MaRDI QIDQ2152117FDOQ2152117
Authors: Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, Noam Nisan
Publication date: 6 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.12023
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
Cites Work
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- How much can taxes help selfish routing?
- Worst-case equilibria
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- How bad is selfish routing?
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
- On Stackelberg strategies in affine congestion games
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