Beyond Pigouvian taxes: a worst case analysis

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_13OpenAlexW4205685765MaRDI QIDQ2152117FDOQ2152117

Authors: Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, Noam Nisan 

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.12023

Recommendations

• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910765
• In congestion games, taxes achieve optimal approximation
• An improved tax scheme for selfish routing
• Taxes for Linear Atomic Congestion Games

zbMATH Keywords

public goodPigouvian taxride sharingPrice of anarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• Worst-case equilibria
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• How bad is selfish routing?
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
• Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
• On Stackelberg strategies in affine congestion games

This page was built for publication: Beyond Pigouvian taxes: a worst case analysis

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2152117)