Beyond Pigouvian taxes: a worst case analysis

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_13MaRDI QIDQ2152117OpenAlexFDO

Authors Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, Noam Nisan

Publication date 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.12023

zbMATH Keywords

public goodPigouvian taxride sharingPrice of anarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

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Cites work

• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
• How bad is selfish routing?
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• On Stackelberg strategies in affine congestion games
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
• Worst-case equilibria

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