The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands.

DOI10.1016/S0167-6377(03)00030-0zbMath1052.91009OpenAlexW2002778126MaRDI QIDQ1400339

Chi Kin Chau, Kwang Mong Sim

Publication date: 13 August 2003

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6377(03)00030-0

zbMATH Keywords

Game theoryPrice of anarchyNon-atomic congestion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Related Items (21)

Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games ⋮ Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games ⋮ On the price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games under asymmetric cost maps and elastic demands ⋮ A convergence analysis of the price of anarchy in atomic congestion games ⋮ Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs ⋮ Toll caps in privatized road networks ⋮ The toll effect on price of anarchy when costs are nonlinear and asymmetric ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of the reliability-based continuous network design problem under cost recovery ⋮ Inefficiency of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium in a traffic network under ATIS ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of the C-logit stochastic user equilibrium assignment ⋮ On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard ⋮ Selfish routing in public services ⋮ A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games ⋮ The price of anarchy in nonatomic consumption-relevance congestion games ⋮ Risk-Averse Selfish Routing ⋮ Efficiency of atomic splittable selfish routing with polynomial cost functions ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium ⋮ Cooperative congestion games: existence of a Nash-stable coalition structure ⋮ A mixed traffic assignment problem and its upper bound of efficiency loss ⋮ A Mean-Risk Model for the Traffic Assignment Problem with Stochastic Travel Times ⋮ Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons

Cites Work

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• Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
• Generic Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Large Crowding Games
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
• Network economics. A variational inequality approach.

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