Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons

DOI10.1002/net.21458zbMath1269.91028MaRDI QIDQ5326768

Tim Roughgarden, Yevgeniy Dodis, Richard John Cole

Publication date: 6 August 2013

Published in: Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/net.21458

zbMATH Keywords

routing; price of anarchy; traffic equilibria; shortest path protocols

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68M10: Network design and communication in computer systems

91A43: Games involving graphs

91A80: Applications of game theory

90B10: Deterministic network models in operations research

Related Items

“Beat-Your-Rival” Routing Games, Congestion games with mixed objectives, A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time, Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Atomic routing games on maximum congestion
• Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
• The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands.
• Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Fast, Fair, and Efficient Flows in Networks
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• Algorithms and Computation
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology