Efficient graph topologies in network routing games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.011zbMath1161.91332OpenAlexW1989972248MaRDI QIDQ1021587

Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Amir Epstein

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.011

zbMATH Keywords

congestion gamesprice of anarchynetwork routing games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Related Items (23)

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games ⋮ Excluding Braess’s Paradox in Nonatomic Selfish Routing ⋮ Computation of equilibria and the price of anarchy in bottleneck congestion games ⋮ Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games ⋮ On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games ⋮ Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess paradox considering elastic demand ⋮ Selfish bin coloring ⋮ Inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in series-parallel network congestion games ⋮ The price of anarchy in series-parallel network congestion games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Capacitated network design games ⋮ A polynomial-time algorithm for detecting the possibility of Braess paradox in directed graphs ⋮ Network characterizations for excluding Braess's paradox ⋮ Congestion games with linearly independent paths: convergence time and price of anarchy ⋮ Congestion games viewed from M-convexity ⋮ Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy ⋮ Risk-Averse Selfish Routing ⋮ Informational Braess’ Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion ⋮ Network Topologies for Weakly Pareto Optimal Nonatomic Selfish Routing ⋮ A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares ⋮ Internalization of social cost in congestion games ⋮ On weak Pareto optimality of nonatomic routing networks ⋮ Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons

Cites Work

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• Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
• Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
• Strong equilibrium in congestion games
• Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games.
• Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Atomic Routing Games on Maximum Congestion
• Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
• Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
• The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow

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