Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_5zbMath1136.91342DBLPconf/sagt/Fotakis08OpenAlexW4243400642WikidataQ59818526 ScholiaQ59818526MaRDI QIDQ5459970

Dimitris Fotakis

Publication date: 2 May 2008

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in series-parallel network congestion games ⋮ Performance of one-round walks in linear congestion games ⋮ Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
• Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
• Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
• Strong equilibrium in congestion games
• Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games.
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games
• Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
• The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
• The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
• Tight Bounds for Selfish and Greedy Load Balancing
• STACS 2004
• Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

This page was built for publication: Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy