Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2453835
Recommendations
Cites work
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Admission control to minimize rejections
- Atomic Routing Games on Maximum Congestion
- Braess's paradox, Fibonacci numbers, and exponential inapproximability
- Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy
- Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
- Fast, Fair, and Efficient Flows in Networks
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Improved Approximation Algorithms for the Demand Routing and Slotting Problem with Unit Demands on Rings
- Linear time algorithms for the ring loading problem with demand splitting
- Multicuts and integral multiflows in rings
- On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
- Path decomposition under a new cost measure with applications to optical network design
- Potential games
- Selfish unsplittable flows
- Stronger bounds on Braess's paradox and the maximum latency of selfish routing
- The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
- The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- The price of atomic selfish ring routing
- The price of routing unsplittable flow
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- The Ring Loading Problem
- Worst-case equilibria
Cited in
(4)
This page was built for publication: Stability vs. optimality in selfish ring routing
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2453835)