Fast, Fair, and Efficient Flows in Networks

DOI10.1287/opre.1070.0383zbMath1167.90391WikidataQ65553918 ScholiaQ65553918MaRDI QIDQ3392070

Nicolás E. Stier-Moses, Andreas S. Schulz, José R. Correa

Publication date: 13 August 2009

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f2d6ee0f08c07d4e9c4788c6f64a10415171540d

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C35: Programming involving graphs or networks

90B10: Deterministic network models in operations research

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