Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
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Publication:834855
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.07.002zbMath1168.91330OpenAlexW2013391976MaRDI QIDQ834855
Yishay Mansour, Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman
Publication date: 27 August 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.107.7895
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