A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.11.004zbMath1456.91007OpenAlexW3034919817MaRDI QIDQ1996175

Michel Le Breton, Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 3 March 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/42253/1/Game_Theoretical_Model_of_the%20_Landscape_theory.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

blocspotential functionslandscape theoryhedonic gamesgradual deviationlandscape equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

Ordinal status games on networks

Cites Work

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• CONGESTION GAMES AND POTENTIALS RECONSIDERED

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