The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis
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Publication:720399
DOI10.1007/s10887-011-9068-zzbMath1222.91047MaRDI QIDQ720399
Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, Klaus Desmet
Publication date: 14 October 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Growth (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/14227
unification; Europe; cultural heterogeneity; genetic diversity; nation formation; secession; Yugoslavia
91B99: Mathematical economics
91B82: Statistical methods; economic indices and measures
91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution
Uses Software
Cites Work
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