The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis

DOI10.1007/S10887-011-9068-ZMaRDI QIDQ720399zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Klaus Desmet, Michel Le Breton, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, Shlomo Weber

Publication date 14 October 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Growth (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/14227

zbMATH Keywords

Europeunificationgenetic diversitycultural heterogeneitynation formationsecessionYugoslavia

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Mathematical economics (91B99)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1439198 (Why is no real title available?)
• Borders and growth
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods
• Fractionalization
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Stability and segregation in group formation
• Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• The Making and Testing of Geographic Gene-Frequency Maps
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures

Cited in

(6)

• Political mergers as coalition formation: an analysis of the \textit{Heisei} municipal amalgamations
• A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory
• The construction of national identities
• PUBLIC GOODS AND THE DISSOLUTION OF STATES
• Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games
• Distance-based social index numbers: a unifying approach

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