The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis
DOI10.1007/S10887-011-9068-ZzbMATH Open1222.91047OpenAlexW2112326359MaRDI QIDQ720399FDOQ720399
Authors: Klaus Desmet, Michel Le Breton, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, Shlomo Weber 
Publication date: 14 October 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Growth (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/14227
Recommendations
Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Mathematical economics (91B99)
Cites Work
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Cited In (6)
- Political mergers as coalition formation: an analysis of the \textit{Heisei} municipal amalgamations
- A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory
- The construction of national identities
- PUBLIC GOODS AND THE DISSOLUTION OF STATES
- Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games
- Distance-based social index numbers: a unifying approach
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