Political mergers as coalition formation: an analysis of the \textit{Heisei} municipal amalgamations

DOI10.3982/QE442MaRDI QIDQ4586176zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Eric Weese

Publication date 12 September 2018

Published in Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/QE442

zbMATH Keywords

Japanmoment inequalitiesmunicipal amalgamationstable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(3)

• A model of referendum
• Citizen preferences and the architecture of government
• Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games

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