A Structural Model of Government Formation
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(26)- Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
- A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
- New results on the identification of stochastic bargaining models
- Proto-coalition bargaining and the core
- Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Modelling negotiated decision making in environmental and natural resource management: a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model with uncertainty
- Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
- Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
- Effectivity functions and parliamentary governance structures
- Statistical analysis of the duration of Italian government cabinets from 1861 to 2001
- Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5280139 (Why is no real title available?)
- Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
- A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
- Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems
- Political mergers as coalition formation: an analysis of the \textit{Heisei} municipal amalgamations
- Corruption and power in democracies
- Executive control and legislative success
- Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game
- Rank effects in bargaining: evidence from government formation
- Equality in legislative bargaining
- Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
- Government formation in a two dimensional policy space
- The formateurs' role in government formation
- Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
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