Equality in legislative bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105701MaRDI QIDQ6072242zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kirill Evdokimov

Publication date 12 October 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105701

zbMATH Keywords

equalityGini coefficientinequalitylegislative bargainingno-delayuniqueness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

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• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
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Cites work

• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• A nonsmooth version of Newton's method
• A Structural Model of Government Formation
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
• Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3781003 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty
• Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model

Cited in

(3)

• Demand bargaining in legislatures
• Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
• Optimal democratic mechanisms: should minorities propose first?

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