Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.08.004MaRDI QIDQ894603zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tasos Kalandrakis

Publication date 2 December 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

uniquenesslegislative bargainingcomputation of equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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Cites work

• A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
• A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
• A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
• A nonsmooth version of Newton's method
• Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective
• Convergence Analysis of Some Algorithms for Solving Nonsmooth Equations
• Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• On Paths Generated by Fixed Point Algorithms
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
• The Jacobian matrix and global univalence of mappings
• The Solution of Systems of Piecewise Linear Equations
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model

Cited in

(6)

• Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
• Bargaining and rent seeking: asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels
• A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games
• Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games
• Equality in legislative bargaining
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6494101 (Why is no real title available?)

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