Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
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Publication:894603
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.004zbMath1347.91157OpenAlexW1425261493MaRDI QIDQ894603
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.004
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Equality in legislative bargaining ⋮ Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
Cites Work
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