Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.08.004zbMATH Open1347.91157OpenAlexW1425261493MaRDI QIDQ894603FDOQ894603
Authors: Tasos Kalandrakis 
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.004
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Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)
Cites Work
- A nonsmooth version of Newton's method
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Convergence Analysis of Some Algorithms for Solving Nonsmooth Equations
- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
- The Jacobian matrix and global univalence of mappings
- A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
- Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
- A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation.
- Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
- A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
- The Solution of Systems of Piecewise Linear Equations
- Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
- On Paths Generated by Fixed Point Algorithms
Cited In (6)
- Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
- Bargaining and rent seeking: asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels
- A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games
- Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games
- Equality in legislative bargaining
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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