The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
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Publication:1317327
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1070zbMath0789.90096OpenAlexW1988908342MaRDI QIDQ1317327
Publication date: 17 April 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1070
infinite gamessubgame perfect equilibriamajority-rule cake division gamemulti-equilibrium dynamic games
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