The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game

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Publication:1317327

DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1070zbMath0789.90096OpenAlexW1988908342MaRDI QIDQ1317327

Ehud Kalai, David P. Baron

Publication date: 17 April 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1070




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