LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12140MaRDI QIDQ5744893zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors T. Renee Bowen

Publication date 10 February 2016

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12140

zbMATH Keywords

legislated protectiontariff bindingsWorld Trade Organization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Protectionist demands in globalization
• The national-security argument for trade protection
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• Protectionism and blocking power indices
• Trips, Trade, and Growth
• International trade and competitiveness
• A re-examination of the effect of GATT/WTO on trade
• Protectionism in a liquidity trap
• Enforcing international trade agreements with imperfect private monitoring

Cites work

• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• On dynamic compromise
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game

Cited in

(2)

• The national-security argument for trade protection
• Protectionist demands in globalization

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