LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12140zbMath1404.91198OpenAlexW1875236929MaRDI QIDQ5744893

T. Renee Bowen

Publication date: 10 February 2016

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12140

zbMATH Keywords

legislated protectiontariff bindingsWorld Trade Organization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• On dynamic compromise
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy

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