LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12140zbMATH Open1404.91198OpenAlexW1875236929MaRDI QIDQ5744893FDOQ5744893

Authors: T. Renee Bowen 

Publication date: 10 February 2016

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12140

Recommendations

• Protectionist demands in globalization
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zbMATH Keywords

legislated protectiontariff bindingsWorld Trade Organization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• On dynamic compromise
• Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo

Cited In (2)

• The national-security argument for trade protection
• Protectionist demands in globalization

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