Fully absorbing dynamic compromise

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.03.013zbMATH Open1297.91086OpenAlexW1984377833MaRDI QIDQ403722FDOQ403722

Authors: Michael Richter 

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.013

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zbMATH Keywords

dynamic legislative bargainingMarkov perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• The dynamics of distributive politics
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
• Can negotiations prevent fish wars?
• Strategic bargaining with destructive power.
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• On dynamic compromise
• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo

Cited In (10)

• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Dividing resources by flexible majority rules
• The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
• On dynamic compromise
• Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
• Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo
• LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
• The dynamics of distributive politics
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game

Uses Software

• repgames

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