Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

DOI10.1093/restud/rdv009zbMath1405.91222OpenAlexW2156790980MaRDI QIDQ4610730

Daniel J. Seidmann, Vincent Anesi

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv009

zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingpolicy persistenceendogenous defaultpork barrel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ Fully absorbing dynamic compromise ⋮ BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH ⋮ Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an evergreen clause ⋮ Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players ⋮ Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power ⋮ Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo ⋮ Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model

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