BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6088676
DOI10.1111/iere.12625zbMath1530.91396OpenAlexW4313524454MaRDI QIDQ6088676
Marina Azzimonti, Unnamed Author, Unnamed Author
Publication date: 16 November 2023
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12625
Cites Work
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
- Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
- Power fluctuations and political economy
- Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
- Improving sovereign debt restructurings
- A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
- Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher
- Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
- The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements
- Policy Inertia, Election Uncertainty, and Incumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties
- A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Political Economy of Redistribution
- Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks
- Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips
- Commitment vs. Flexibility
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
This page was built for publication: BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
