Commitment vs. Flexibility
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5489082
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00666.xzbMath1145.91367OpenAlexW3123911340MaRDI QIDQ5489082
Iván Werning, Manuel Amador, George-Marios Angeletos
Publication date: 25 September 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.178.8024
social securityflexibilitycommitmenthyperbolic discountingself-controlintertemporal preferencestemptation
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (22)
A theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors ⋮ Pre-commitment and flexibility in a time decision experiment ⋮ Discounted quotas ⋮ Optimally sticky prices: foundations ⋮ Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ⋮ Money burning in the theory of delegation ⋮ Durable goods as commitment devices under quasi-hyperbolic discounting ⋮ Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive ⋮ Choice theoretic foundation for libertarian paternalism: reconciling the behavioral and Libertarian approaches to welfare ⋮ A model of consumption-dependent temptation ⋮ Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers ⋮ On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship ⋮ BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH ⋮ Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts ⋮ A triple test for behavioral economics models and public health policy ⋮ Performance of procrastinators: On the value of deadlines ⋮ The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a new Keynesian model with private information ⋮ A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints ⋮ Identifying subjective beliefs in subjective state space models ⋮ A continuum of commitment ⋮ For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment ⋮ Robust leverage dynamics without commitment
This page was built for publication: Commitment vs. Flexibility
