Commitment vs. Flexibility

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2006.00666.XMaRDI QIDQ5489082zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Manuel Amador, Iván Werning, George-Marios Angeletos

Publication date 25 September 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.178.8024

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentflexibilityhyperbolic discountingsocial securityself-controlintertemporal preferencestemptation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(36)

• On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship
• Personalized pricing, network effects, and commitment
• Optimally sticky prices: foundations
• A theory of personal budgeting
• A theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors
• Pre-commitment and flexibility in a time decision experiment
• For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
• Commitment, flexibility, and optimal screening of time inconsistency
• A model of consumption-dependent temptation
• Commitment contracts
• A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
• Interregional spillovers and optimal budget institutions under asymmetric information
• Present-bias and the value of sophistication: splurging vs. smoothing
• Comment on ``Commitment vs. flexibility
• Discounted quotas
• Durable goods as commitment devices under quasi-hyperbolic discounting
• Time-inconsistent contract theory
• On the consumption-saving tradeoff under non-exponential discounting and partial commitment
• BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
• A continuum of commitment
• Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive
• Money burning in the theory of delegation
• Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
• Choice theoretic foundation for libertarian paternalism: reconciling the behavioral and Libertarian approaches to welfare
• A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts
• Commitment contracts with action constraints
• Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts
• Dynamically consistent menu preferences
• A triple test for behavioral economics models and public health policy
• Performance of procrastinators: On the value of deadlines
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Robust leverage dynamics without commitment
• Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement
• Identifying subjective beliefs in subjective state space models
• The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
• Present bias: understanding zero leverage policy and unstable capital structure

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