Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.06.003MaRDI QIDQ2675445zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthias Fahn, Regina Seibel

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardpresent biaslabor marketson-the-job search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Present bias in partially sophisticated and assisted agents
• Present bias
• Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?

Cites work

• Choice and procrastination
• Commitment contracts
• Commitment vs. Flexibility
• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Incentives for Procrastinators
• Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
• Naïveté-based discrimination
• Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games

Cited in

(4)

• Time-inconsistent bargaining and cross-commitments
• Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
• Consumer exploitation and notice periods
• Present-biased preferences and the effect of illiquid assets

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