Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.06.003zbMATH Open1498.91225OpenAlexW4283160273MaRDI QIDQ2675445FDOQ2675445

Authors: Matthias Fahn, Regina Seibel 

Publication date: 23 September 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.003

Recommendations

• Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Present bias in partially sophisticated and assisted agents
• Present bias
• Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardpresent biaslabor marketson-the-job search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games
• Choice and procrastination
• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Incentives for Procrastinators
• Commitment vs. Flexibility
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• Commitment contracts
• Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
• Naïveté-based discrimination

Cited In (4)

• Time-inconsistent bargaining and cross-commitments
• Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
• Consumer exploitation and notice periods
• Present-biased preferences and the effect of illiquid assets

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