Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive
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Publication:2675445
Recommendations
Cites work
- Choice and procrastination
- Commitment contracts
- Commitment vs. Flexibility
- Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
- Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
- Incentives for Procrastinators
- Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
- Naïveté-based discrimination
- Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games
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