Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
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Publication:900252
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.06.007zbMath1331.91114OpenAlexW836409565MaRDI QIDQ900252
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.06.007
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
- Choice and Procrastination
- Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Incentives for Procrastinators
- Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
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