Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
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Publication:913628
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-OzbMATH Open0699.90015WikidataQ56481616 ScholiaQ56481616MaRDI QIDQ913628FDOQ913628
Authors: Drew Fudenberg, Bengt Holmstrom, Paul R. Milgrom 
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
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- Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
Cited In (39)
- Retained earnings, interest rates and lending relationship
- Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
- DEA models for two decision makers with conflicts: the principal-agent problem
- Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement
- Optimization models for salesforce compensation
- Endogenous market incompleteness with investment risks
- Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment
- Impatience versus incentives
- Optimal allocations in growth models with private information
- Principal-agent models
- Optimal retention in agency problems
- Optimal Length of Labor Contracts
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
- Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
- Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
- Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value
- Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
- Myopic agency
- On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information
- Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
- Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
- Markets with endogenous uncertainty theory and policy
- Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
- Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
- The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality
- Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
- Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
- Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
- Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
- Short-Term Contracting and Strategic Oil Reserves
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
- Robust contracting and corporate-termism
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
- Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
- Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
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