Robust contracting and corporate-termism

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2022.110344zbMATH Open1484.91248OpenAlexW4210881202MaRDI QIDQ2127302FDOQ2127302

Authors: Siqi Zhao 

Publication date: 20 April 2022

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110344

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

investmentambiguitycontract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
• Uncertain dynamics, correlation effects, and robust investment decisions

Cited In (4)

• Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation
• Optimal short-termism and liquidity management
• Conditions for rational investment short-termism
• Robust leverage dynamics without commitment

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