Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.013MaRDI QIDQ2016226zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolás Porteiro

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171306

zbMATH Keywords

matchingassignmentcontractsmoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers
• Dynamic matching and evolving reputations
• Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Occupational choice and dynamic incentives.
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Superstars and Mediocrities: Market Failure in the Discovery of Talent¹
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• The assignment game. I: The core

Cited in

(6)

• Optimal Length of Labor Contracts
• Matching with nonexclusive contracts
• Bidding for incentive contracts
• Explaining the spread of temporary jobs and its impact on labor turnover
• Participation in moral hazard problems
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

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