Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.013zbMATH Open1296.91177OpenAlexW2092796860MaRDI QIDQ2016226FDOQ2016226

David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolás Porteiro, Inés Macho-Stadler

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171306

zbMATH Keywords

matchingassignmentcontractsmoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations
• Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Occupational choice and dynamic incentives.
• Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers
• Superstars and Mediocrities: Market Failure in the Discovery of Talent¹

Cited In (4)

• Matching with nonexclusive contracts
• Bidding for incentive contracts
• Participation in moral hazard problems
• Explaining the spread of temporary jobs and its impact on labor turnover

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