Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2016226
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.013zbMath1296.91177MaRDI QIDQ2016226
David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolás Porteiro, Inés Macho-Stadler
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171306
91B68: Matching models
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