Dynamic matching and evolving reputations

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00567.XzbMATH Open1197.91152MaRDI QIDQ3406033FDOQ3406033

Authors: Axel Anderson, Lones Smith 

Publication date: 12 February 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result
• The Fragmentation of Reputation
• REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
• Dynamic models of reputation and competition in job-market matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Matching models (91B68)

Cited In (14)

• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• Job matching within and across firms
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Dynamic models of reputation and competition in job-market matching
• Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
• On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
• A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result
• POSITIVE SKILL CLUSTERING IN ROLE‐ASSIGNMENT MATCHING MODELS
• Sorting expertise
• Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
• Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies
• Incentives and the structure of teams
• Production and learning in teams
• Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size

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