Dynamic matching and evolving reputations

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00567.XMaRDI QIDQ3406033zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Axel Anderson, Lones Smith

Publication date 12 February 2010

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result
• The Fragmentation of Reputation
• REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
• Dynamic models of reputation and competition in job-market matching

Cited in

(14)

• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Job matching within and across firms
• Dynamic models of reputation and competition in job-market matching
• Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
• On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
• A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result
• POSITIVE SKILL CLUSTERING IN ROLE‐ASSIGNMENT MATCHING MODELS
• Sorting expertise
• Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
• Incentives and the structure of teams
• Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies
• Production and learning in teams
• Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size

This page was built for publication: Dynamic matching and evolving reputations

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3406033)