Dynamic matching and evolving reputations
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Publication:3406033
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- On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
- A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result
- POSITIVE SKILL CLUSTERING IN ROLE‐ASSIGNMENT MATCHING MODELS
- Sorting expertise
- Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
- Incentives and the structure of teams
- Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies
- Production and learning in teams
- Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
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