REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING

DOI10.1142/S0219198906000990zbMath1197.91049MaRDI QIDQ3421634

Thierry Vignolo

Publication date: 7 February 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryreputationchain-store gamematching processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• The chain-store paradox revisited
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The chain store paradox
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• A note on reputation: more on the chain-store paradox
• The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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