The rationality of predatory practices has been extensively debated among economists and lawyers. \textit{R. Selten} [ibid. 9, 127-159 (1978; Zbl 0374.90085)] considered a fictitious chain-store confronted with potential entrances of local competitors. In his formal analysis via an extensive game with complete and perfect information predatory behavior is precluded by the unique sequential (and perfect) equilibrium. \textit{D. M. Kreps} and \textit{R. Wilson} [J. Econ. Theory 27, 253-279 (1982; Zbl 0485.90093)] and \textit{P. Milgrom} and \textit{J. Roberts} [ibid. 27, 280-312 (1982; Zbl 0485.90013)] established in modified models with incomplete information that predation against early entrants may be rational since it creates a reputation to the effect that later potential entrants are deterred. The present paper offers a modification of Selten's model with complete but imperfect information which renders possible reputation and deterrence.
- Agreeing to disagree
- An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078992 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Note on von Neumann-Morgenstern's Strong Independence Axiom
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Sequential Equilibria
- Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle
- The chain store paradox
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory
- The chain store paradox
- A note on reputation: more on the chain-store paradox
- Rationalizable predatory pricing
- Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story
- Multiple rounds in a chain store game
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- Threshold distance versus side payment to reduce the cannibalization effect in retail chain expansion
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