Commitment, reputation, and entry deterrence
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Publication:2367159
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Cited in
(17)- The chain-store paradox revisited
- Uncertainty and entry deterrence
- Entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model
- Reputation and entry deterrence under short-run ownership of a firm
- Multiple rounds in a chain store game
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
- Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
- Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
- Commitment and entry-deterrence in a model of duopoly
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944104 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841903 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1859310 (Why is no real title available?)
- Commitment in Organizations and the Competition for Talent
- A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
- Entry deterrence by cheap talk
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
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