Entry deterrence by cheap talk

DOI10.1111/BOER.12309MaRDI QIDQ5870237zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeong-Yoo Kim

Publication date 6 January 2023

Published in Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12309

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkentry deterrencefully revealing equilibriumpartially revealing equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited in

(5)

• Entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model
• Free entry may reduce total willingness-to-pay
• Entry deterrence and limit pricing under asymmetric information about common costs
• Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab
• FAILING FIRM DEFENCE WITH ENTRY DETERRENCE

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