Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria

DOI10.2307/2526628MaRDI QIDQ3479761zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kaushik Basu, Nirvikar Singh

Publication date 1990

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526628

zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrencelimit pricing modelpost- entry market behaviorprecommitmentStackelberg perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
• Commitment and entry-deterrence in a model of duopoly
• Commitment, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry
• Entry deterrence and limit pricing under asymmetric information about common costs

Cited in

(29)

• How risk disciplines pre-commitment
• Uncertainty and entry deterrence
• Entry deterrence and limit pricing under asymmetric information about common costs
• Natural monopoly and differential pricing
• Staggered contracts and profitable entry deterrence: An application to professional sports
• Financial intermediation and entry-deterrence
• Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
• A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly
• Credible spatial preemption in a mixed oligopoly
• Investment flexibility as a barrier to entry
• Commitment, reputation, and entry deterrence
• A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry-exit game
• Quality and entry deterrence
• Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
• Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry
• Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
• Limit Pricing when the Potential Entrant is Uncertain of its Cost Function
• Commitment and entry-deterrence in a model of duopoly
• Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence
• Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination
• Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm
• Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence
• Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look
• Entry deterrence by cheap talk
• Pricing and entry strategies for competitive firms with optimistic entrant
• Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
• The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies
• Entry under uncertainty: limit and most-favored-customer pricing

This page was built for publication: Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3479761)