A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90146-PMaRDI QIDQ1802095zbMATHFDO

Authors Elie Appelbaum, Shlomo Weber

Publication date 13 April 1994

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrenceunder-investmenttwo-stage gamesubgame perfect Nash equilibriamultiple incumbents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
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• Symmetric Cournot oligopoly and economic welfare: A synthesis
• Entry deterrence and free riding in license auctions: incumbent heterogeneity and monotonicity
• Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria

Cites work

• Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
• Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
• Uniqueness of equilibrium for smooth multistage concave games

Cited in

(6)

• Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games
• Entry deterrence and free riding in license auctions: incumbent heterogeneity and monotonicity
• Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs
• Co-investment deterrence
• Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
• Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem

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