Entry deterrence and free riding in license auctions: incumbent heterogeneity and monotonicity
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Publication:2690337
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Cites work
- A Bertrand model of pricing and entry
- A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Comparative statics of mixed-strategy equilibria in noncooperative two- person games
- David vs. Goliath: An Analysis of Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium based upon expected utility and quadratic utility
- Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
Cited in
(6)- Regulations, regime switches and non-monotonicity when non-compliance is an option: an application to content protection and preference.
- Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
- License Fees in Oligopoly When Outside Innovator can Enter the Market: Two-Step Auction
- Auctions of licences and market structure
- Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
- A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly
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