Entry deterrence and free riding in license auctions: incumbent heterogeneity and monotonicity
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Publication:2690337
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2020-0143OpenAlexW3138417080MaRDI QIDQ2690337FDOQ2690337
Publication date: 16 March 2023
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0143
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Cites Work
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Asymmetric Auctions
- A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
- Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium based upon expected utility and quadratic utility
- A Bertrand model of pricing and entry
- Comparative statics of mixed-strategy equilibria in noncooperative two- person games
- David vs. Goliath: An Analysis of Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence
- Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
Cited In (6)
- Regulations, regime switches and non-monotonicity when non-compliance is an option: an application to content protection and preference.
- Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
- License Fees in Oligopoly When Outside Innovator can Enter the Market: Two-Step Auction
- Auctions of licences and market structure
- Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
- A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly
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