Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
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Publication:4531033
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00240zbMath1055.91517OpenAlexW2148268719WikidataQ59885269 ScholiaQ59885269MaRDI QIDQ4531033
Benny Moldovanu, Philippe Jehiel
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2838/1/dp99_74.pdf
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