Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.001zbMath1417.91225OpenAlexW2613718136MaRDI QIDQ2425157

Brian Baisa, Justin Burkett

Publication date: 26 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valuesnon-quasilinear preferencesex post efficient auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (1)

Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity

Cites Work

• On efficiency of the English auction
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
• The Implementation Duality
• Auction design without quasilinear preferences

This page was built for publication: Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences