Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.03.001MaRDI QIDQ2425157zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Brian Baisa, Justin Burkett

Publication date 26 June 2019

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valuesnon-quasilinear preferencesex post efficient auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Auction design without quasilinear preferences
• English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
• Asymmetric English auctions.

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Auction design without quasilinear preferences
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• On efficiency of the English auction
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• The implementation duality
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect

Cited in

(4)

• Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
• Auction design without quasilinear preferences
• Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
• Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity

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