On efficiency of the English auction
From MaRDI portal
Publication:634510
Recommendations
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- Second best efficiency and the English auction
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Efficient Auctions
- On the efficiency of the first price auction
- The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
- Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- An Efficient Auction
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
Cited in
(16)- Second best efficiency and the English auction
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
- Buy-price English auction
- An ascending double auction
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
- Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
- Optimal cost overruns: procurement auctions with renegotiation
- An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
- English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
- Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
- Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices
This page was built for publication: On efficiency of the English auction
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q634510)
